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Z&JPREFACE  This report provides  summaries  of  the  papers and discussions at
the fourth Consortium on Trade Research held in Berkeley,
Calif.,  December 17-19, 1981.  Conveners of the meeting were
Andrew Schmitz and Alexander  Sarris  of  the  Department of
Agricultural and Resource Economics of the University of
California at Berkeley.
The Consortium focused on the structure and  behavior of
international agricultural commodity markets and the  effect of
Government policy on market behavior.  Copies  of  the  papers as
presented at  the  Consortium or in their  final published form
are available from the authors on request.
This summary report was prepared  by Charles  E. Hanrahan and
T. Kelley White,  Economic  Research Service,  U.S.  Department of
Agriculture.  Summaries of  the papers  and the discussants'
comments were prepared from materials submitted by the
contributors  to  the Consortium.
iiiFOREWORD  The  fourth meeting of the Consortium on Trade Research focused
on the nature and behavior of the  international markets for
agricultural commodities and how Government objectives  and
policy affect those markets.  These are  important issues for
U.S. agriculture and agricultural policymakers.  They challenge
USDA's Economic Research Service  (ERS), Foreign Agricultural
Service  (FAS), and trade researchers  in the academic community
to work closely together to  improve  our understanding  of how
these important commodity markets work and to enhance  the
formulation of agricultural trade policy.
The goal of increased interaction between ERS and academic
researchers was realized in June 1980 by establishing the
Consortium on Trade Research.  FAS  joined the Consortium in
1982.  The objectives of  the Consortium are to:
o  Foster sustained efforts in international trade research
which emphasize domestic impacts  of policy developments in
international commodity markets.
o  Encourage and facilitate  interaction between ERS,  FAS,  and
university trade policy researchers.
o  Provide a forum for the exchange of research results and the
ideitification of problems and policy issues requiring
research.
The Consortium is a cooperative undertaking between ERS,  FAS.
and various universities.  Membership in the Consortium  is
mutually agreed upon by ERS,  FAS,  and university participant.
but is  generally open to  those who have an interest and are
prepared to make a contribution.
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CONTENTSHIGHLIGHTS  International markets for agricultural commodities are not
perfectly competitive.  Thus, the usual  assumptions underlying
the perfectly competitive model of market  behavior--perfect
knowledge, a large number of firms, free  entry into  the market,
absence of market power, or ability to  influence prices by any
single market participant--do not hold  for international
agricultural commodity markets.  The fourth Consortium on Trade
Research conducted by USDA's Economic Research Service, the
Foreign Agricultural Service, and several universities  addressed
market structure, the impact of Government  policies on market
behavior, and analytical tools for studying imperfect markets.
Participants examined  the role and  effect of Government  policies
which try to  improve price information.  Market information
provided by government agencies, such as USDA diminishes  the
information advantages that large private speculative firms have
in commodity  trading, enables smaller firms  to  participate in
those markets, and tends to enhance price stability especially
where futures trading is  important in price formation, as  in the
United States.
How government policies, macroeconomic  as well as  strictly
agricultural, affect agricultural prices, national income, farm
returns, farm asset values, inflation, and other variables were
treated in several economic models presented by Consortium
participants.
An econometric  model of the world wheat market probed the
interaction of domestic policy and world market  prices.
According to model results, the world wheat price is about  10
percent lower than it would be in the absence of trade
restrictions.  Model results also indicated that the  United
States and the  European Community  (EC) are  the two trading
groups that can significantly influence world wheat prices.
Hence, U.S.-EC cooperation would be necessary for  any world
price stabilization schemes.
The Consortium examined aspects of the  exercise of market  power
and how different policy objectives motivate the behavior of
major participants in the world wheat market employing a game
theoretic model.  Game  theory holds considerable promise as a
tool for analyzing international trade,  although additional
experimentation is  needed.  The analysis  suggests that
Government policymakers place different values on  the welfare of
various interest groups.  Thus, the assumption of maximization
of net social payoff in models of market behavior is inappro-
priate because it ignores important distributional issues.
The Consortium explored the roles of marketing boards, as in
Canada and Australia, versus private  trade, as  in the United
States and Argentina, in pricing and exporting grain.  Results
indicated that if  the Canadian Wheat Board hedged through the
futures market both price and production risks of  producers
could be reduced.  Whether or not the Board could act as a
private trader in  this fashion and the impact of  its actions on
prices are open to  question.  The Board would sell forward a
vilarge volume  of grain in a very short  time  but  private  traders,
especially the large grain companies, enter the market
continuously and both buy and sell incrementally.
A Consortium paper on the process  of making  agricultural trade
policy decisions in the Federal Government  elicited a discussion
on the role of university-based agricultural trade policy
research in relation to the interagency decisionmaking process.
University research, because of its orientation and the  time
required to produce results can contribute to  the  stock  of
knowledge about trade but is  unlikely to  play a major direct
role  in trade policy decisionmaking.  However, university work
on the  structure of markets and the behavior of  trading
institutions and Government may contribute more explicitly to
decisionmaking on agricultural trade  policy.
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Markets for agricultural commodities  are speculative markets
and, as such, raise questions about the effect of speculation
on "informational efficiency"  or price stability.  This  paper
addresses the following two questions about Government policies
which are designed to improve price  formation, given a
speculative market environment where futures trading plays an
important role in  price formation:
1. Would excluding certain retail speculators  from trading in
commodity futures contracts decrease the  amount of noise in
prices and thereby increase the informativeness  of  prices by
weeding out speculators who have no  economic need to  trade
and no information which is not already well known?
2. Does a policy of using public money to  collect information
such as  crop forecasts and export data and to  distribute that
information to all market participants tend  to increase the
information value of prices?
The model of price formation is  based on assumptions different
from those generally made  by economists modeling other markets.
In modeling other markets, it is  often assumed  that  traders all
have the  same information, that all traders  are  so  small that
none has an effect on market  prices, and  that all  traders are
risk averse.  By contrast,  this  paper assumes  that some traders
can acquire private information which they do not share with
others,  that these traders are  so large  that their trading
activities  have an effect on price which they take into account
in making trading decisions, and  that these traders are risk
neutral.  A special class of traders,  called market makers,
earns a small profit by adjusting prices to the  flow of  trade
when they act as intermediaries between other  groups of
traders.  These assumptions  capture important features of
commodity trading  in agricultural  products which may be miss-
ing in typical models  of financial and commodity markets.Within the  context  of  this model,  the trading activities of
uninformed retail speculators initially tend  to  increase  price
fluctuations.  But  the increased price  fluctuations  induce
informed traders  to trade more,  smoothing out the  initial
increase in price fluctuations and making  the market more
liquid.  This  increased liquidity makes  it  easier for large
traders  to  obtain private information, because  they can take
larger positions without having larger adverse effects  on
prices.  This  enhanced profitability attracts more traders  into
an increasingly competitive market.  Also,  prices become more
informationally efficient, or equivalently, more stable,
suggesting that in the long run, retail  speculation leads
indirectly to more stable prices,  and  that conversely,  a policy
of discouraging retail speculation would  eliminate  these
benefits.
Collection and publication of information by USDA not  only has
the direct effect  of  increasing  informational efficiency  but
also the  indirect  effect of forcing  private speculators  to
reveal more  of  their  private information  to maximize their
profits.  In  other words,  the  increase in informational
efficiency  is more  than one would guess  at  first  glance.
Furthermore,  although such a policy might drive some  large
private speculators  from  the market by making  their information
less valuable,  it  does not discourage  such private speculation
enough to  eliminate increased price stability caused by  the
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The paper addresses domestic price policy for  an agricultural
commodity in a country where producer, consumer, and Govern-
ment treasury gains and preferences  for producer and
consumer price stability are explicitly traded off to  arrive
at a specific set of yearly prices  for  producers and consumers.
These prices  derive from an optimization process and are
functions of the international prices  that the country faces.
Given these  "optimal domestic price policies,"  the  international
price is,  in turn, determined by the interaction of  the excess
demands of all trading countries.
Because  the resulting international price explicitly
incorporates all of  the parameters which enter into  the separate
domestic policy decisions,it becomes easy  to assess  the
influences of individual country-specific policies on  the world
market and on the internal markets of  trading partners.
The  theoretical idea  is  tested on an empirical model of  the
world wheat economy.  Current domestic price levels  in the
various  trading countries are used  to derive implicit welfare
weights for producers, consumers, and Government treasuries of
the main trading countries.  The impacts of  various policy
changes are  then investigated.
The empirical results suggest that  the current world price level
for wheat is about 10  percent below what it  would be  in the
absence of all of the  trade restrictions around  the world.  The
Common Agricultural Policy of  the European Community  (EC)
appears  to be the single greatest cause of  this  discrepancy.
Furthermore, the United States and  the EC  can significantly
influence world wheat price variability.  Hence,  their
cooperation would be crucial in any world price stabilization
scheme.
Empirical studies  of the world wheat market have generally
assumed  that a neoclassical competitive model can adequately
describe  trading behavior.  However, evidence on market
structure and  the existence  of institutions  through which
monopoly power can be exercised support the hypotheses advanced
by several researchers of  imperfectly competitive markets.
Therefore,  this paper develops a model of  the world
market incorporating elements of imperfect competition and based
on game theoretic concepts.
The model developed addresses  the following issues:
1. What objectives motivate the behavior of the major
participants in the world wheat market?
2. How do domestic and international policies interact to
determine income distribution  to various domestic interest
groups?3. How does a country's behavior in international markets depend
on its domestic policies?
4. If the world wheat market is  characterized as imperfectly
competitive, how can the interactions between traders be
captured in a model?
To address these issues the model that is developed allows for
simultaneous endogenous government  policy formation in all
countries, for policy retaliation,  and for the evolution and
dissolution of coalition structures.  The model relies upon a
Government criterion function to  yield a set  of first-order
conditions for optimal  trading behavior and optimal Government
intervention.  Using revealed preference theory, these
first-order conditions  are used to  determine the marginal value
policymakers place on the welfare of various domestic interest
groups.  From the first-order conditions,  bargaining functions
can be derived that represent a country's policy choice set.
Given these bargaining relations and a set  of equilibrium
conditions  (rules of the game),  an international market solution
can be obtained.  The revealed preference evidence is also used
to measure the conjectural variations  faced by a country in the
international market, which may be used to  indicate what sort of
equilibrium condition applies  to that country's trading
behavior.  This paper indicates how such a model could be put
together for the world wheat market  from typical domestic
econometric models.  Estimates of conjectural variations  as well
as revealed Government objectives have been obtained for three
countries.
Preliminary analysis of Canada, Japan, and the United States
over the past two decades suggests that  the values Government
policymakers place on the welfare of various  interest groups are
not equal and not stable over time.  Hence, maximization of net
social payoff  (as is  commonly assumed)  is an inappropriate
Government criterion function, because important distributional
issues are ignored.  Further, the conjectural variation of  the
trade  elasticity faced by each country is estimated.  Apparently
Canada views the conjectural variation of the excess demand it
faces as variable.  Hence, a closed-loop game  theoretic solution
is necessary.  In contrast, Japan does not appear  to  treat the
conjectural variation of  the excess supply elasticity it
confronts as variance, hence an open-loop  solution is
appropriate.  Finally, U.S. policy is  developed on the
assumption that the excess demand it faces  is  perfectly
inelastic.
Future research will need to  examine the policy behaviors of
other major traders--Australia, Argentina,  the EC, and Centrally
Planned countries--to determine  the values  these countries'
policymakers place on the welfare of domestic interest groups
and to estimate these countries' conjectural variations.  By
including the other major traders,  the world wheat market model











World commodity markets  deviate from the perfectly  competitive
paradigm in two respects--individual countries introduce
distortions between domestic producer, consumer, and world
prices, and  some countries  possess market power in some
commodities.  The paper analyzes  the effects  of  these features
on the issue of stabilizing commodity prices.  The first  part
discusses whether the presence of a stable  configuration of
market distortions strengthens  the case  for commodity price
stabilization, and finds that  under certain  circumstances  the
answer  is yes.  In this section, countries are assumed  to set
policies not  to pursue market power, but for  other, largely
redistributive reasons.
If, on the other hand, countries have a monopoly in commodity
supply, one  can ask whether such countries would seek more or
less stabilization than a competitive market.  Here  the answer
is  that  if  the monopolist chooses  to  stabilize prices,  it will
engage in more stabilization than the  competitive market;
otherwise, the monopolistic market will supply as  much
stabilization as the competitive market.
Finally, the paper explores the role  of  an international buffer
agency countervailing the power of a  monopoly producer, and
examines  the Nichols-Zeckhauser case  for considerable
countervailing stockpiling.  This result is sensitive  to the
specification of the bilateral  trading environment and the
choice of  policy instruments available to  the  importer.
Comments by Eric Monke:  The degree of  competition  in
international agricultural commodity markets  remains  a  matter  of
dispute.  Few economists would argue  that market share
calculations, without  the complementary analysis of structure
and conduct, are useful for  the identification of  imperfect
competition.  Market shares of total exports provided in this
paper are worse indicators of market  power, because these
figures ignore the potential for domestic response to  attempted
manipulation of international markets.  Even if  these numbers do
indicate potential market power,  they appear to  be far less than
100 percent.  Newberry's analysis is couched in a monopoly
framework, and  it is  not  clear that oligopolies will mimic
monopolistic behavior.
Regardless  of its  relevance to agriculture, the argument has
intrinsic interest.  Do market imperfections strengthen the  case
for price stabilization policies?  The answer appears to be no.
When the market imperfections involve  importation, Newberry
demonstrates that the case for stabilization policies is
strengthened only in the presence of quotas, and then only if
the quotas are binding less  than half the time.  Because the
latter case implies that free trade conditions prevail more than
half the  time, domestic resource allocation will be largely
unaffected in this situation.  Thus quotas are not likely to
result in significant rent  transfers to domestic  producers, and
they are not likely to lobby for quota policies.  For  the case
in which quotas are binding, Newberry shows that some benefitsThe Simple
Analytics of
Price  Supports














of price stabilization are already realized by the  quota policy,
and the need for further  stabilization programs is  lessened.
On imperfections on the export side  of  the market, Newberry
compares the storage behavior of a monopolist relative to  that
undertaken for perfectly competitive production.  The case for
stabilization seems indeterminate and depends on  the shape of
the demand curve.  If the demand curve  is  inelastic upward and
elastic downward, for example, a monopolist will gain from price
instability and undertake less storage  than  in a perfectly
competitive market.  A more definite answer to  the  question
seems possible, however.  Because the monopolist will never
market output which earns negative marginal revenue, production
exceeding  the quantity associated with zero marginal revenue
will be either destroyed or stored.  Thus  the distribution of
potential  prices will be truncated relative to  the  distribution
of prices observed under perfectly competitive production.
Prices will be more stable under monopoly, and, therefore,  the
need for price stabilization policies is  lessened.
In this paper, we model agricultural price  and income policy
through various  stages of the development of U.S.  agriculture.
The emphasis  is on the effects  of  Government intervention under
conditions of uncertainty.  We analyze  the interaction of price
supports and/or deficiency payments, acreage  controls, stocks,
and export subsidies, recognizing that many other policy
instruments also exist.  However, to  include more instruments in
our framework is beyond our capabilities.  Using the uncertainty
framework in this paper, it is  clear why the  Brannon proposal  is
a least-cost policy to  pursue and why export subsidies during
the sixties could be economically justified.
Also, we clearly show why producers prefer price instability to
stability when target prices are used  to  protect farmers against
downside risk.  Because of the growing importance of  interna-
tional trade,  grain stocks increase since the  profitability of
holding  stocks  increases because of  the nature of aggregate
demand.  In this case,  Department of Treasury costs can be
reduced substantially given a specified level at which farm
prices are  to  be supported.  Through  the use of  storage,  farm
income can be maintained, and, at the same  time,  governments can
reduce their outlays on subsidies because  the growth in
international trade makes  the aggregate demand  for U.S.  products
increasingly more price elastic.
A three-sector quantitative policy model of the U.S. agricultural
sector, the balance of  the domestic  economy, and  the
international economy is  constructed to evaluate  the
effects of policy changes and of noninstrument shocks on  the
performance of  the agricultural sector and on  the general
economy.  Policies evaluated include macroeconomic measures
emanating from fiscal, monetary, and exchange rate spheres as
well as agricultural sector policies such as acreage diversions,
price supports, storage subsidies,  and trade import quotas.Gordon C. Rausser  Examples of noninstrument  shocks include droughts  and surges in
Soviet grain-import requirements.  The framework incorporates
and  the interrelationships among the  three sectors,  determining the
forward and feedback links and  includes  the sector as  well as
Harry de Gorter  general economic policy instruments.  The  framework is  designed
to generate an assessment of a number  of performance measures
including general economic inflation, national  income, and
agricultural sector returns and asset values.
Key issues addressed include:
1. What are the effects of  other exogenous shocks  on the
agricultural sector and the  general economy?
2. Should sector policies  in agriculture  be designed  to deal
with specific shocks on the agricultural sector?
3.  Are sector policies more or less important than macroeconomic
policies in analyzing various policies and their effects on
the agricultural sector?
4.  What is the relative effect of agricultural sector policies
on the general economy as well as  the agricultural sector?
To respond adequately to each of the  issues,  the  framework is
constructed  to evaluate  the following shocks:
1.  A dramatic shift in grain export demand.
2.  A dramatic environmental-induced change in agricultural crop
production.
3.  A change in agricultural policy such as price-support
schemes, land-use controls, and  public holding of  stocks.
4.  A change  in fiscal policy.
5. Changes  in monetary policy, including sterilization or no
sterilization of changes in foreign account and in Government
deficit; and accommodation, or not,  for real shocks  in the
agricultural sector and the balance of  the  international
economy.
6. Changes  in exchange rate policy couched in terms of fixed,
flexible, and Government-managed  floating exchange rate
regimes.
To assess the effects of these shocks, key features are
incorporated into the model representation including explicit
treatment of public versus private grain storage, detailed
agricultural sector policies, and policy reaction functions for
both monetary and agricultural sector instruments; a flex price
specification for the agricultural sector and a fixed price
specification for the domestic economy;  explicit links with the
international economy and endogenous determination of theexchange rate; and explicit links between the domestic economy
and the agricultural sector through agricultural input markets;
inventory investment equations for agriculture and the balance
of the  economy along with fixed investment  relationships for
breeding stocks in the livestock sectors;  and margin
relationships between farm and retail prices.
The results of experiments reported include a
permanent-versus-temporary increase in  crop export demand, a
restrictive monetary policy, and a bountiful harvest in the 1981
crop year.
The model results indicate that  the framework adequately
incorporates the  interactive and feedback effects of
macroeconomic policies, sectoral policies,  and noninstrument
shocks on key performance variables  in  agriculture and the
general economy.  Much insight appears  to be gained by focusing
on a model representation which is  integrative  in scope and
distinguishes key features such as public-versus-private
decisions, policy reaction functions, and fix/flex prices.
The results indicate that policy and noninstrument shocks:  (1)
have different shortrun and longrun effects  in terms of  both
magnitudes and direction on key performance measures;  (2) have
effects  that  result in sectoral policies which may be
substituted for or  are complementary with macroeconomic policies
in either  the short or long run with some reversals  occurring
due  to the dynamics of the meat  sector; and (3) are  either
exacerbated for  some policies or ameliorated for others by
including the endogenous  policy reaction functions.












Alex F.  McCalla
International wheat prices have been highly unstable in the past
decade,and wheat producers in the major  exporting countries have
faced significant amounts  of both price and  production risk.
The systems for marketing wheat differ  significantly among  these
countries  as  do  the methods  of risk management by wheat
producers.  Australia and Canada have central selling agencies,
and in the United States and Argentina, the  private trade is
responsible for pricing and exporting wheat.  The  purpose of
this paper  is  to explore  the ability of each of the market-
ing systems  to manage price and production risk.
Australian and Canadian farmers receive a pooled average price
for their wheat, but  the  U.S.  price received changes daily.
However, through the  use of  futures and forward contracts, U.S.
farmers  can sell their wheat any time before, during, or  after
the harvest.  That is,  they can either hedge or  speculate on
their wheat sales.  In Canada, neither of  these pricing options
is available.
The pooling concept,  as  it  is  currently practiced, is  one which
views marketing wheat as an activity that  takes  place after the
crop is  harvested.  This does not  allow farmers the  option to
8forward sell  at  the time of the production decision and,
therefore, does not allow them to manage price risk between the
date of planting and the beginning of  the crop year  (August 1 in
Canada) when production is  known with good certainty.
This paper demonstrates that in a market where prices  are well
balanced, pooling after production offers nothing over hedging
through the futures market.  Wheat prices are  distributed in a
symmetric fashion, and it is argued  that the timing of wheat
sales within a particular  crop year  is,  on average,  not critical.
Price pooling, as  it  is now practiced by the Canadian and
Australian Wheat Boards, exposes risk-averse  producers  to a
significant amount of price risk which could be reduced if  the
pool practiced a forward selling or hedging  program at  planting
time, passing along a more accurate initial price  to producers.
This treats production and marketing as  simultaneous rather  than
recursive decisions.  The end result would be a larger output
and a higher level of utility  for producers.
The optimal hedge, accounting for both price and production
uncertainty, was  calculated for Canadian wheat producers.  It
was found that the Canadian Wheat Board, on behalf of producers,
should hedge  through the  futures market  (or  by forward sales) a
very large percentage of  expected output each spring before
planting.
Comments by Alex F. McCalla:  Professor Carter has  prepared a
most interesting paper.  It has  three  parts:  the  first tests
the symmetry of wheat futures  prices;  the second explores the
question of whether, if output is known, farmers marketing to
agencies such as  the Canadian Wheat Board, would be better off
if the  Board hedged as  compared to  current pooling policy;  and
the third part explores  the  question that,  if  production is
unknown  (for example, prior to  planting), would farmers  be
better off by hedging either through the Board or individually.
The conclusion:  the Board should hedge.  This has  clear  policy
implications.
Let me begin with some specific comments.  The statistical
procedures used in  the paper are quite interesting.  To  test
Dalton's proposition that futures'prices  are skewed to  the  left,
Professor Carter Colin uses  the generalized  characteristic
function for a family of  stable symmetric functions.  He
concludes prices are symmetric but  that they are distributed in
a Paretian stable distribution rather  than a normal distribution
thus questioning Dalton's results.  However, when he  turns to
testing the benefits of hedging using the same prices, he
assumes agents maximize expected utility using a mean-variance
criteria.  Clearly, here, he is  using a normal distribution.  It
seems to me the reader deserves more explanation for the
transition.
My second point concerns an ambiguity about who is  hedging.  It
is  clear that the Board would hedge as an entity but who ishedging in the private market?  Is  it  a representative farmer,
some mythical "market" hedger, or  each farmer?  If  it  is  the
latter, there would be a distribution of  outcomes and also
substantial  transaction costs which in sum would clearly exceed
Board costs.
A'third issue relates to the discussion of  the  timing of  the
Board's  price announcement.  The analysis  is  based on pre-1972
and post-1980 Board practices of announcing initial prices after
planting.  But  in the period 1972-80, the Board did announce
preplanting  prices.  How well did  it  do?  Some coefficients  of
variation throughout  the paper seem to  suggest the  Board does
badly.  But the analysis is  incomplete.  It  seems  to me
Professor Carter should go further  and test several expectations
models.  As  it  is now, it implies  that  preplanting prices are
worse than nothing, but, again, the analysis  is  incomplete.
My fourth point relates to the assumption that Board hedging
would have no impact on Chicago prices.  In two  separate places,
he argues this case.  First he says Canadian wheat production is
only 3 percent of world production.  This number is  irrelevant.
The real number  is  Canadian.production relative to  the volume  of
wheat traded in Chicago.  At the end of the paper he argues  that
the Canadian crop is less than 3 percent of the volume  of
futures contracts traded in Chicago.  Again this  is not likely
relevant because most  contracts are  traded many times.  The more
relevant comparison might be to  open interest on the actual
volume  of grain represented by futures contracts.  My subjective
judgement  is  that if the Canadian Wheat  Board sold forward 15
million metric tons of wheat in a relatively  short time,  it
would indeed have a price impact.  To argue  that private  traders
handle similar volumes  is open to  question because  private
traders,  such as  Cargill, are continuously in the market, on
both sides,  trading incrementally.  This  is  far different  than
the Board entering once a year and only on one  side of  the
market.  Clearly price  impacts would need  to be  included in
computing the potential benefits of  Board hedging.
Finally, Professor Carter's paper raises important issues
regarding Board policy.  However,  the  tone of  the paper bothers
me a bit.  Colin talks of  the "weaknesses" of  the Board in terms
of poor  price  signals and riskiness  of  final prices, but clearly
the market isn't perfect  either.  His  conclusion that pooling  is
no better  than hedging, when production is known, is only
relating to price risk.  But  suppose pooling  offers additional
normative benefits--for example, equity and not being penalized
for poor marketing decisions.  Clearly these equity issues are
at  the historical foundation of  the Canadian Wheat  Board.  I
believe analysts  should carefully limit  the implication of  their
analyses  to  the specific issues addressed.
In sum, it  is a good paper.  I like the basic issue
addressed--namely the necessity of  treating production and
marketing decisions  simultaneously.
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George  E.  Rossmiller
Discussant:
Timothy E. Josling
The workings of  the Federal executive branch in making decisions
on agricultural trade policy is examined.  To illustrate  this
decision, the author used a case study of a domestic injury
complaint by the Pennsylvania mushroom industry  that asked the
U.S. Government  to  provide temporary relief from import
competition.  The case study illustrates  that:  (1) the
interagency  group as a decision body  is highly operational,  (2)
economic analysis  is only one of  several factors  that influence
the final decision, and  (3)  most issues have a long history, but
the need for decisionmaking may arise  quickly, sometimes
unpredictably, and  the  time frame for such decisions  is usually
extremely short, thus limiting  the time for problem solving.
The paper points out that concerning the  input  of  economic
analysis into the decision process:  information provided to  the
interagency group must  be simple, brief, and  defensible, and
problem-solving economic analysis must  draw upon the  stock of
pertinent research available at  the  time  the problem arises.  A
major role for  the trade  researcher is  as contributor to  the
stock of knowledge from which the problem-solving analysts might
draw.  Agricultural trade economists might also broaden their
base of participation to include interaction with other agencies
besides the  U.S. Department of Agriculture.
Comments  by Timothy Josling:  Dr. Rossmiller has taken a
step-by-step approach through the  administrative process of
deciding on an import relief petition.  His interesting paper
demonstrates the  complexity of the interagency process  in making
trade policy.  The paper, by implication, indicates  the minor
role that academic-or university-based research plays in the
real world of trade policy.  Rather than commenting on the issue
of canned mushrooms or specifically on  the interagency process,
my remarks will  be on  the interface of academic research and
actual trade policy decisions.
University work on trade policy can perhaps  be loosely
classified as four types:
1. Parameter estimation and quantitative projections  of  trade in
specific  commodity markets.
2. Descriptions and/or models of interrelationships among
markets.
3. Effects on welfare and the measurement of  protection levels
for particular countries and commodity policies.
4. Examination of  the structure of markets and the impact of
policies on market behavior.
The first  of these types of research has an obvious if  limited
value for  practicioners of trade policy.  The body of empirical
literature on commodity trade flows yields at the least some
rough "ballpark" estimates of elasticity parameters, which can
be used in the ad hoc analyses of trade policy problems.
Unfortunately, the large number  of commodities  and countries to
11be covered and the rapid changes  in market  conditions under
particular circumstances make it likely that  the  probability of
finding a recent and soundly based empirical study will be
small.  I suspect that this market intelligence function is  more
the province of the Economic Research Service than of university
academics, however valuable the  estimation of market models as a
training device for graduate students.
The understanding of the complexities  of trade,  in particular
the interactions  among commodity, foreign exchange, labor, and
capital markets, seems naturally to  be a function best
undertaken in the quiet contemplation of a  university.  Much
original work has been done  in this  area by agricultural
economists in the  past few years.  However, my intuitive feeling
is that much of  the  value in this work is in educating fellow
economists who are steeped in microanalysis and single-commodity
models, rather than policymakers, who usually  start with a firm,
if nonanalytical, grasp of interdependencies.
The estimation of trade policy impacts  on real income and  income
distribution is a third hallowed area  for academic  exploration.
As an ex post critique  of  policy actions, welfare models are
fine.  As an ex ante prop for decisionmaking, I doubt whether
they are greatly valued.  The objective function is  usually not
specified in the way that the  policymaker sees it,  and  the
constraints  are difficult to  build in.  Moreover, the amount  of
policy detail needed to be useful in an actual  decision is
probably more than can comfortably be  incorporated into most
trade-policy models.
A fourth area  of  research seems  to hold some promise of whetting
the policymakers' appetites.  The recent  emphasis on the
structure of trade and  the behavior  of trading institutions and
governments seems  to  strike a chord.  Policymakers  clearly
eschew the ubiquity  of competitive markets.  Market power models
formalize what is intuitively known and give policy an explicit
function in the working of markets.
Coordination of university research and government  trade policy
formulation could certainly be  improved by more  interchange of
ideas,  topics, data, and basic policy information.  This is an
issue which the Trade Research Consortium might wish to  pursue.
But by  its nature, academic research  into agricultural trade
policy  is unlikely ever  to play a major direct  role in actual
trade policy decisions.
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